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NOTE 
VALUATION DISCOUNTS 
AFTER ESTATE OF NOWELL v. 
COMMISSIONER: A CLEAR 
FORMULA FOR REDUCING 
ESTATE TAXES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner,l the Tax Court consid-
ered the issue of valuation discounts2 on property for purposes 
of calculating federal estate and gift tax liability.3 In its 
memorandum opinion, the court held that transferred property 
is. valued without considering other similar property held by 
either the transferor or transferee for estate and gift tax pur-
4 . poses. 
The Nowell decision provided two important rules. First, a 
family may transfer property to various trusts and then claim 
that the total value of all trusts is worth less than the value of 
the underlying property because each trust owns only a partial 
share of the property.s This is true even when the family still 
owns and controls the trusts and, therefore, owns and controls 
1 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239 (1999). 
2 See infra notes 35 - 83 and accompanying text. 
3 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1242 (1999). 
4 See id. 
S See id. 
679 
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all the property.6 Second, Nowell provides an additional valua-
tiondiscount when an interest in a limited partnership is 
transferred and the transferee is treated as an assignee' as 
opposed to a substitute limited partner.8 This discount is 
available even when the transferee owns one hundred percent 
of the remaining partnership, making the distinction between 
an assignee and a full partner irrelevant.9 
Part II of this note will discuss the relevant law as it ex-
isted at the time Nowell was decided. Parts III and IV will 
then describe the circumstances surrounding the case and how 
it came to be heard by the court. Next, Part V will offer an ex-
planation of the Tax Court's analysis, which will then be cri-
tiqued and supported in Part VI. Part VII will conclude this 
note by discussing a method by which to use the Nowell case to 
obtain maximum valuation discounts in estate planning. 
To begin, it is important to note that Nowell is a Tax Court 
Memorandum case.10 Generally, when the Tax Court desig-
nates a ruling as a "memo case," the case is simply restating 
existing law and does not set new precedent.ll The case still 
carries the usual precedential value, but its value is lessened 
by its reiterative nature.12 This classification, however, has not 
always been strictly followed. IS The court may have used the 
memorandum designation in Nowell because it ruled only on 
cross-motions for partial summary judgment; nevertheless, 
Nowell is important for providing a bright-line rule for struc-
6 . See id. 
7 
The distinction between an assignee and a partner is important because, in gen-
eral, an assignee cannot exercise the normal rights of a partner. An assignee has only 
the right to the distribution of income from the partnership. An assignee can neither 
interfere in the management of the busine8s nor require any information or account of 
partnership transaction8. See 59A AM. JUR. 2d Partnerships § 506 (1987). 
8 
See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243 (1999). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 1239. 
11 
See WILLIAM A RAABE ET AL., WEST'S FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH 117 (2d ed. 1987). 
12 
See id. 
IS 
See id. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/8
2000] ESTATE TAX 681 
turing estate plans to obtain the maximum valuation 
discount. 14 
II. BACKGROUND 
A federal transfer tax is imposed on both the gifts a person 
makes during his or her life and the assets transferred at 
death. 16 Prior to 1976, two independent systems existed for 
calculating this estate tax: one for taxing the value of assets 
transferred at death and another for taxing inter-vivos trans-
fers. 16 In 1976, Congress combined the two methods into a sin-
gle unified gift and estate tax system, which today imposes a 
tax on the inter-vivos and testamentary transfer of wealth by 
every citizen or resident of the United States. 17 Only gifts val-
ued at more than $10,000 per donee during a single calendar 
year are subject to tax; gifts valued at less than $10,000 per 
donee per year are exempt. IS Because a person can make gifts 
to an unlimited number of donees each year, this annual exclu-
sion is a much-used planning tool for reducin~ estate taxes.19 
In calculating the estate tax, every decedent is allowed a 
unified credit20 against the tax.21 For 1999, this unified credit 
14 See Estate of NoweU, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243 (1999). 
16 See RoBERT A ESPERTI ET AL., GENERATIONS - PLANNING YOUR LEGACY 7 (1999). 
16 See DOUGLAS A KAHN ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES, 2 (3d 
ed.1997) 
17 See I.R.C. § 2oo1(a) (1999). "A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the tax-
able estate of every decedent who isa citizen or resident of the United States." Id. 
IS See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1999). Exclusion from gifts -
In General - In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property) 
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $10,000 of such 
gifts to such person shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total 
amount of gifts made during such year. 
Id. 
~ . 
For example, if a husband and wife have four married children, the husband and 
wife could each make a gift of $10,000 to each child and to each child's spouse. This 
would allow the husband and wife to reduce their taxable estate by $160,000 each 
year. See I.R.C. § 2503(b). 
20 Unified Credit Against Estate Tax is the title of I.R.C. § 2010, hence the term, 
"unified credit." However, in amendments to section 2010 in 1997 Congress uses the 
3
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eliminated the transfer tax on the first $650,000 of the estate 
and cumulative gifts of each decedent.22 The credit amount 
increased to $675,000 in 2000 and increases in years thereafter 
until 2006 when the maximum credit will be $1,000,000.23 
When the value of the estate and all taxable lifetime trans-
fers exceed the amount of the unified credit, the unified gift 
and estate tax is imposed on the excess.24 The tax rate begins 
at thirty-seven percent and increases to a maximum rate of 
fifty-five percent when the estate is valued at $3,000,000.25 
These taxes, however, are not applied to the transfer by a 
decedent to the surviving spouse when the marital deduction is 
used.26 That is, if certain requirements are met, transfers to a 
spouse are deducted from the value of the decedent's estate 
and thus not subject to the unified estate and gift tax.27 One 
term "applicable credit amount." I.R.C. § 2010(c). It is possible the term "unified 
credit" will be replaced with "applicable credit." I.R.C. § 2010 (c) (1999). 
21 
See I.R.C. § 2010(a) (1999). "A credit of the applicable credit amount shall be al-
lowed to the estate of every decedent against the tax imposed by section 2001." [d. 
22 See I.R.C. § 2010(c). 
23 See id. 
24 
25 
26 
In the case of a decedent 
dying and gifts made, during: 
1998 
1999 
2000 and 2001 
2002 and 2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 or thereafter 
See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1999). 
See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1999). 
See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1999). 
The applicable 
exclusion amount is: 
$625,000 
$650,000 
$675,000 
$700,000 
$850,000 
$950,000 
$1,000,000 
Allowance of Marital Deduction - For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, 
the value of the taxable estate shall, except as limited by subsection (b), be determined 
by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any 
interest in property which passes to or has passed from the decedent to his surviving 
spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value 
of the gross estate. 
[d. 
27 See I.R.C. § 2056(a). 
4
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requirement, called the terminable interest rule, is that the 
interest passing to the surviving spouse must pass freely and 
must not terminate or pass to another party unless the sur-
viving spouse decides to do SO.28 The legislature, however, cre-
ated a significant exception to this terminable interest rule for 
qualified terminable interest property ("QTIP"), which does not 
pass freely.29 If the estate makes an election on the estate tax 
return to have the property treated as QTIP property, it will be 
treated as passing to the surviving spouse even though the 
surviving spouse has only a life interest, which extinguishes on 
the death of the surviving spouse, and no power to designate 
the beneficiaries.30 When a QTIP election is made, the prop-
erty qualifies for the marital deduction and, therefore, is not 
taxed in the estate of the first-to-die.31 Absent a statute to the 
contrary, logic would not require the property to be taxed in 
the surviving spouse's estate because the surviving spouse only 
holds a life interest in the property.32 The legislature, how-
28 See I.R.C. § 2056(b). 
General Rule - Where, on the lapse of time, or the occurrence of an event or contin-
gency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the 
surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this sec-
tion with respect to such interest. 
[d. 29 See I.R.C. § 2056(bX7). 
In General - In the case of qualified terminable interest property - for purposes of 
subsection (a), such property shall be treated as passing to the surviving spouse and, 
for purposes of paragraph (1XA), no part of such property shall be treated as passing 
to any person other than the surviving spouse. Qualified Terminable Interest Property 
Defined. - For purposes of this paragraph - In General - The term "qualified termina-
ble interest property" means property - which passes from the decedent. in which the 
surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for life, and to which an election 
under this paragraph applies. Qualifying Income Interest for Life. The surviving 
spouse has a qualifying income interest for life if - the surviving spouse is entitled to 
all the income from the property, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, or 
has a usufruct interest for life in the property, and no person has a power to appoint 
any part of the property to any person other than the surviving spouse. [d. 
30 See ill. QTIP elections are typically used when there is a second marriage and 
children from the first marriage. The decedent wishes to provide income to the second 
spouse but ensure the children from a prior marriage receive an inheritance. See 
Kahn, supra note 16, at 292. 
31 See I.R.C. § 2056(bX7) (1999). 
5
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ever, enacted such a statute to the contrary with section 2044 
of the Internal Revenue Code (IR.C.), which ensures that the 
property does not escape the transfer tax.33 This section re-
quires that the estate of the surviving spouse include the value 
of the QTIP property even though the surviving spouse held 
only an income interest that was extinguished on his or her 
death.34 
A. PLANNING TO REDUCE ESTATE TAXES 
1. Family Limited Partnerships 
While taxes generally discourage large gifts, the use of 
family limited partnerships as a planning tool facilitates 
them.36 When used for estate planning, two family members, 
typically a husband and wife, form a partnership and contrib-
ute assets. 56 The partners can then make annual gifts of own-
ership interests in the partnership worth $10,000 to their chil-
dren instead of making gifts of the underlying assets owned by 
the partnership.57 Numerous advantages in using this family 
limited partnership tool include the following:36 a) parents are 
able to maintain complete control over the underlying assets if 
they own all of the general partnership interests; b) the par-
ents can pay themselves most or all of the income from the 
32 See Terry S. Jones, Comment, Estate of Bonner v. United States: QTIPS and 
Fractional Interest Discounts: Whipsaw Wonderland, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 595, 608 - 609 
(1997). 
sa See I.R.C. § 2044 (1999). This code section simply states that if the QTIP election 
is made on the estate tax return of the first spouse-to-die, then the property must be 
included in the estate of the second spouse-to-die: 
(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of any property to which 
this section applies in which the decedent had a qualifying interest for life. 
(b) This section applies to any property if-
a deduction was allowed with respect t the transfer of such property to the decedent 
under section 2056 by reason of subsection (bX7) thereof .... Id. 
34 See id. 
35 See Esperti, supra note 15, at 271. 
36 S id ee . 
37 See id. at 272. 
3S S id ee . 
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partnership because they manage the partnership; c) the part-
nership interests given as gifts are subject to valuation dis-
counts; d) the limited partners have limited liability. 
The effect of the family limited partnership is that donors 
reduce the value of the assets in their estate on death, while 
maintaining control over and income from the assets during 
their lives.39 Additionally, donors may distribute the limited 
partnership assets to the intended heirs and provide a plan of 
succession for the ownership of the businesses.40 Family dis-
agreements over ownership may also be reduced when assets 
are transferred during the parent's life.41 
2. Valuation Discounts 
Valuation discounts may be used to reduce the value of as-
sets and the corresponding tax liability.42 The Treasury 
Regulations define the value of property as the fair market 
value, which is "the price at which the property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. n43 In considering the 
fair market value, the regulations require the tax return filer 
to consider, "[all] relevant facts and elements of value as of the 
applicable valuation date .... "" For exapmple, if less than 
one hundred percent of an asset is transferred, the valuation of 
the transferred interest may be decreased by considering such 
factors as lack of control, inability to influence day-to-day 
management, liquidation rights, distribution of profits, and 
39 See id. at 274 - 275. 
40 See Esperti, supra note 15, at 274-275. 
41 See id. at 274 - 275. 
42 See Sharon J. Ritter, A Historical Perspective on Minority Discounts, 82 TAX 
NOTES ToDAY 1993, 1993 (1999). 
43 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965). "The value of every item of 
property includible in a decedent's gross estate under section 2031 through 2044 is its 
fair market value at the date of death .... " Id. 
44 Id. 
7
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voting power.46 These particular factors gave rise to the con-
cept of minority interest discounts,46 which is one way to re-
duce the value of transferred property.·7 It is important to 
note, however, that because families frequently transfer inter-
ests in closely held companies between family members for less 
than fair market v~ue, the IRS closely scrutinizes the value 
placed on the interests transferred.48 
Valuation can be difficult depending on the type of 
property:9 Real property and publicly traded securities are 
relatively easy to value because there is a market where buy-
ers and sellers engage in frequent transactions.60 Closely held 
businesses, on the other hand, are more difficult to value be-
cause there are few owners and sales are infrequent.61 The 
Treasury Regulations, nevertheless, offer some . guidelines. 62 
For example, Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-3 states that 
valuation of the goodwill of the business requires special atten-
t . 63 Ion. 
45 See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193. 
46 See infra notes 55 - 63 and accompanying text. 
47 See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193. For example, if a piece of real estate is worth 
$100,000 a ten percent interest in that real estate is not worth $10,000 because the 
owner of the ten percent interest cannot force a sale of the property, cannot demand 
distributions of profits, or otherwise control and manage the property. See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
60 See id. 
61S Ri ee tter, supra note 44, at 193. 
62 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (as amended in 1992). 
The net value is determined on the basis of all relevant factors including -
A fair appraisal as of the applicable valuation date of all the assets of the business, 
tangible and intangible, including goodwill; 
The demonstrated earning capacity of the business; and 
The other factors set forth in paragraphs (0 and (h) of § 20.2031-2 relating to the 
valuation of corporate stock, to the extent applicable." 
[d. 
63 See id. Although no definition for goodwill is provided by either the I.R.C. or the 
regulations, I.R.C., section 197(d) categorizes goodwill with going concern value, 
workforce in place, etc., thereby implying that goodwill is the same as going concern 
value, workforce in place, etc. From an accounting standpoint, goodwill is defined as 
8
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The use of family limited partnerships, combined with 
valuation discounts, provide planning opportunities to signifi-
cantly reduce estate taxes.54 Some of the more commonly used 
discounts include minority interest discounts, lack of market-
ability discounts, liquidation discounts and fractional interest 
discounts, each of which are discussed more fully below: 
a. Minority Discounts 
A person owning less than a majority of the managing in-
terest cannot control or have a meaningful voice in the man-
agement of the assets. 56 This minority interest gives rise to the 
minority discount, which is based on factors such as lack of 
control, inability to influence day-to-day management, lack of 
liquidation rights, lack of control over distribution of profits; 
and limited voting power.56 These minority discounts are 
available on both transfers at death and inter-vivos gifts. 57 
However, the minority discount is not automatic. 58 A discount 
may be disallowed if the transferor made the transfer solely to 
fragment control over a block of stock to obtain a minority dis-
count.59 For example, in Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner,60 
the decedent held a power of appointment over a controlling 
the excess of the total value of a business over the value of the specifically identifiable 
assets owned by the business. RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 834 (4th ed. 1991). 54 See Eric Thomas Carver, A Valuation Primer: Trends and Techniques for Estate 
Planners, 77 MICH. B.J. 1304, 1304 (1998). 
55 See Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78, 106 (1986). "The minority discount is 
recognized because the holder of a minority interest lacks control over corporate pol-
icy, cannot direct the payment of dividends, and cannot compel a liquidation of corpo-
rate assets." [d. 
66 See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193<. 
57 See Ward, 87 T.C. at 108. The court looked to the Treasury Regulations and 
found the gift tax regulations, as well as the estate tax regulations, rely on the willing 
buyer and willing seller rule to determine value. Specifically the court looked at 
regulation 25.2512-1, which states, "[t]he value of the property is the price at which 
such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, nei-
ther being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and both having reasonable knowledge 
of relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 25.512-1 (as amended in 1992). 
58 See Carver, 8,upra note 56, at 1305. 
59 
See W. 
60 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645 (1990). 
9
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block of stock in a closely held corporation representing 51.41% 
of the outstanding stock.61 Eighteen days before her death, the 
decedent made gifts of .88% of the stock to each of her two 
children, thereby reducing her interest to 49.65%.62 The court 
found that the sole purpose of this transfer was to obtain a mi-
nority discount for a controlling block of stock and disallowed 
the discount.63 
b. Lack of Marketability Discounts 
The lack of marketability discount recognizes that a stock in-
terest in a closely held company has fewer potential purchas-
ers than publicly traded stock.64 In Estate of Andrews v. Com-
missioner,65 for example, the decedent owned stock in four 
closely held corporations.66 The court held that when the par-
ties made no actual arm's-length sale with which to determine 
fair market value, alternate methods must be used to value an 
interest in a corporation.67 Similarly, in Estate of Folks v. 
Commissioner,66 the decedent owed a majority interest in a 
closely held corporation.69 The court found that stock that was 
not freely and actively traded was subject to a "lack of market-
ability" discount equal to thirty-five percent of its appraised 
value. 70 Courts have thus upheld a lack of marketability dis-
61 . See id. at 645 (1990). 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See Carver, supra note 56, at 1306. "A discount for lack of marketability is de-
fined as a discount from the normative value arising because of the inherent difficulty 
in the sale of an asset, requiring that the sale price between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller be reduced." ld. 
65 79 T.C. 938 (1982). 
66 See id. at 938 (1982). 
67 See id. at 940. "In the absence of arm's-length sales, the value of closely held 
stock must determined indirectly by weighing the corporation's net worth, prospective 
earning power, dividend-paying capacity, and other relevant factors." leI. 
68 43 T.C. M. (CCH) 427 (1982). 
69 See id. at 427 (1982). 
70 See id. 
10
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count in valuing both majority and minority interests in closely 
held companies.71 
c. Liquidation Discounts 
The cost of liquidating assets held by a corporation or part-
nership also reduces the value of an interest in the corporation 
or partnership.72 For example, in Estate of Dougherty v. 
Commissioner,73 the decedent owned one hundred percent of 
the stock of a corporation. 74 The court allowed a discount for 
the cost of liquidating the real estate held by a corporation.76 
d. Fractional Interest Discounts 
The fractional interest discount recognizes that less than 
one hundred percent of an asset is inherently less appealing to 
a purchaser than the entire asset.76 This fractional interest 
discount differs from a minority discount in that a fractional 
interest discount may apply even if more than fifty percent of 
the asset is owned, as seen in Estate of Pillsbury v. Commis-
sioner.77 In Pillsbury, the decedent owned an undivided sev-
enty-seven percent interest in real property. 78 The court rec-
ognized the effect of a fractional interest, even though it was a 
majority interest, and allowed a discount for co-ownership.79 
The court reasoned that a majority owner of the property 
needs an agreement or consent of the minority owner in order 
to exercise all of the rights ofownership.80 The effect ofa frac-
tional interest discount is such that when two or more parties 
71 
See Carver, supra note 56, at 1306. 
72 See id at 1307. 
73 59 T.C.M (CCH) 772 (1990). 
74 See id. at 772. 
76 See id. 
76 See Carver, supra note 56, at 1307. 
77 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1992). 
78 See id. at 286. 
79 See id. at 287. 
80 See id. 
11
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own property as co-tenants all of the owners have equal rights 
of possession.81 Consequently an owner who holds less than a 
fifty percent interest may therefore restrict the actions of an 
owner of a majority interest.82 This problem of concurrent 
ownership reduces the value of the shared interests and thus 
gives rise to a fractional interest discount.83 
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF VALUATION DISCOUNTS 
In general, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") does not 
endorse valuation discounts.84 In fact, the IRS has fervently 
and consistently argued against their use in Tax Court because 
they can reduce tax liabilities of estates so dramatically.85 Be-
ginning in 1940 with Hooper v. Commissioner,86 however, the 
Tax Court has frequently allowed the use of valuation dis-
counts.S7 
1. Estate of Bright v. United States -An Attempt to Strike 
Down Valuation Discounts on the Transfer of Closely Held 
Stock 
In Estate of Bright v. United States,88 a seminal case in fed-
eral estate taxation, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit rejected the IRS's attempt to strike down a valua-
tion discount on the transfer of stock in a closely held group of 
SI See Carver, supra note 56, at 1307. Each co-tenant has the right to equal use 
and possession of the property. See id. 
S2 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 For an example of the Internal Revenue Service's argument against minority in-
terest discounts on corporate stock see Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 
1001 - 1002 (5th Cir. 1980) and infra part II.B.l. For an example of the Service's posi-
tion on fractional interest discounts see Estate of Propstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248, 1251 
(9th Cir. 1982) and infra notes 135 - 148 and accompanying text. 
85 See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193. 
88 41 B.T.A. 114 (1940). 
S7 See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193. 
88 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981). 
12
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corporations.89 In so doing, the court held that stock owned in 
part or in full by one spouse prior to death could not be attrib-
uted to the surviving spouse for purposes of valuing the prop-
erty for the transfer tax.so Rather, the stock transferred by 
the deceased spouse should be valued independently of any 
stock held by the surviving spouse.91 
In Bright, a husband and wife owned fifty-five percent of 
the stock of an affiliated group of corporations as community 
property.92 The wife, who predeceased her husband, had de-
vised her half, 27.5% of the stock, to a trust for the benefit of 
her children with the husband named as trustee.93 This devise 
was subject to a transfer tax.94 The value of the 27.5% of stock, 
however, could not be calculated on the basis of recent sales of 
the stock because the stock was not publicly traded.95 Thus, 
the estate used an appraised fair market value and then 
claimed a fifty percent discount due to lack of liquidity and 
unmarketability of the minority interest.96 The IRS disagreed 
with the discount and assessed additional tax and interest of 
more than $3,000,000 upon the estate.97 
The estate paid the deficiency and instituted a suit against 
the IRS for a refund.98 The district court held in favor of the 
89 See id. The Bright decision is important because it is the first appellate decision 
to reject the IRS's argument of family attribution. Subsequent decisions have relied 
on Bright to allow minority discounts. See id. 
90 See id at 1005. 
91 See id. 
92 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1000. 
9SS id ee . 
94 See I.R.C. § 2001(a). 
95 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d 999, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980). The remajnjng forty-five 
percent of the stock not held by the decedent and her husband was owned by not more 
than four individuals with one person owning thirty percent. See id. 
96 See id. at 1008. In this case, an expert witness established the value of the stock. 
The dissent points out the value of the 27.5% interest was placed at $4,402,970 and a 
discount of fifty percent was used to reduce this to $2,201,485. See id. at 1000. 
97 See id. at 1000. 
98 See id. at 1000. 
13
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estate and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed.99 During the appeal, the IRS agreed that the 
property to be valued was the property actually transferred, 
not the interest in the property held by the decedent before 
death or by the legatee after death.loo Nevertheless, the IRS 
argued that the actual property in this case was an undivided 
one-half interest in a controlling fifty-five percent block of 
stock as opposed to the 27.5% interest in the corporation.101 
Accordingly, the IRS argued that the proper valuation method 
would be to assign a value to the whole controlling block and 
then use one-half of that amount as the value of the amount 
transferred. lOS This characterization would result not only in 
loss of the fifty percent minority interest discount, but would 
also give rise to a premium, and a subsequent increase in 
value, because of the husband's ability to control the corpora-
tion through ownership of more than fifty percent of the 
stock. lOS 
The Fifth Circuit Court disagreed· with this position, noting 
that under the community property laws of Texas, property is 
subject to partition at the request of either the estate or the 
surviving spouse.104 Consequently, because the estate had no 
way to prevent the conversion of the controlling block into two 
99 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 999. 
100 See ill. at 1001. This concept was established in United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 
170 (5th eir. 1962). In Land the decedent owned a partnership interest that was sub-
ject to a restrictive agreement that depressed the value of the interest. The restriction 
expired on the death of the decedent. The court held the restriction did not affect the 
value of the interest for estate tax purposes because the property is valued at the 
instant of death and at that time the restriction was no longer effective. See Land, 303 
F.2d 170. 
101 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1001. 
102 See id. This would completely eliminate the minority discount because by defi-
nition a minority discount is not allowed when more than fifty percent of the stock is 
owned. See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See ill. 
14
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parts each holding a 27.5% interest, the estate's interest was 
limited to the value of a single 27.5% interest.l05 
Attempting to find another way to strike down the discount, 
the IRS argued for the application of the family attribution 
principle, which gives constructive ownership to one family 
member of stock actually owned by another member.106 The 
IRS reasoned that because the husband and wife owned the 
stock as a control block during their lives and because the hus-
band continued to control the entire block after her death, he 
would not sell the estate's shares as a minority interest.107 
Under this reasoning, the transferred stock should be valued 
as part of the fifty-five percent block, thus eliminating the dis-
108 
count. 
The Fifth Circuit Court rejected the government's family at-
tribution argument for three reasons.109 First, case law sug-
gested that the principle was inapplicable. 110 For example, in 
Estate of Lee v. Commissioner,1l1 a husband and wife owned, as 
community property, most of the stock in a closely held corpo-
ration and upon the death of the wife, the stock passed to the 
husband. l12 The court held that the transferred stock was to be 
valued as a block separate from the shares owned by the hus-
105 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1001. The court cited Estate of Lee v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978), as support for this position. In Lee, a husband and wife 
each owned, as community property, eighty percent of the common stock and one 
hundred percent of the preferred stock of a corporation. The court found that upon the 
death of the wife, her estate held forty percent of the common and fifty percent of the 
preferred stock. Icl. (citing Estate of Lee, 69 T.C. at 874). 
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 1002. To support the idea of the estate continuing to have control of 
the stock after death of the devisee, the government relied on the fact that the hus-
band was the executor of the estate and trustee. The fiduciary duty from such a posi-
tion, presumably, prevented him from partitioning the stock and reducing its value. 
See id. 
108 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1002. 
109 See id. 
110 S id ee . 
111 69 T.C. 860 (1978). 
112 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1002 (citing Estate of Lee, 69 T.C. at 874). 
15
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band. us Similarly, in Estate of Heppenstall v. Commissioner,ll4 
the taxpayer owned 2,310 shares, representing more than fifty 
percent of the stock in a family corporation.115 He made gifts of 
three hundred shares each to his wife and three children for a 
total transfer of 1,200 shares.u6 The Tax Court allowed a dis-
count, reasoning that while the donor no longer held a control-
ling share, he made gifts of less than fifty percent and thus did 
not convey control to any single donee.117 Likewise, in Estate 
of Phipps v. Commissioner,U8 the taxpayer made gifts of stock 
to several family members and argued for family aggregation1l9 
on the theory that, when combined, the gifts represented so 
large a portion of the corporation that a blockage discount ap-
plied.12O Consistent with other family aggregation cases, the 
Phipps court held that each gift should be valued separately.12l 
Finally, in Whitemore v. Fitzpatrick/22 the taxpayer, who 
owned all 820 shares of a corporation, made gifts of 200 shares 
to each of his three sons. l28 The court held that gifts to sepa-
rate donees should be valued separately and thus a minority 
discount applied. 124 
ll3 See ill. (citing Estate of Lee, 69 T.C. at 874). 
114 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1949). 
115 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1003 (citing Estate of Heppenstall v. Commis-
sioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) (1949». 
116 S ill ee . 
117 See ill. 
11S 127 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 19(2). 
119 The terms "family aggregation" and "family attribution" have essentially the 
same meaning. See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1004 (citing Estate of Phipps v. 
Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 19(2». 
120 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1004. A blockage discount refers to the situa-
tion that occurs when a single person holds so large a share of the stock that to sell 
the stock would have a depressing effect on the price. See CCH, Federal Tax Service § 
0:2.40. 
121 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1004 (citing Estate of Phipps, 127 F.2d 214). 
122 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954). 
128 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1004 (citing Whitemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. 
Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954». 
124 [d. 
16
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The second reason the Fifth Circuit Court rejected the prin-
ciple of family attribution is because it is inconsistent with 
Treasury Regulations and the willing buyer-seller rule con-
tained therein. l25 Regulation 20.2031-1(b) states that when 
determining fair market value one must look to the price at 
which the property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and seller when neither is coerced to act and both have 
knowledge of all relevant facts. l28 Under this scenario, the 
willing seller is not the actual seller, but rather a hypothetical 
seller who cannot be assumed to own property other than that 
which is the subject of the valuation.l27 This idea is supported 
by the concept that the estate tax is a tax on the transfer of 
property at death and that the valuation of property trans-
ferred is determined at the moment of death.128 "It would be 
strange indeed if the estate value of a block of stock would vary 
depending on the legatee to whom it was devised. ,,128 
The third and final reason the court rejected the family at-
tribution principle was to maintain a stable and predictable 
body of law. 130 This stability is especially important in tax law 
because of the widespread reliance on established principles 
125 See id. at 1005 (citing Treas. Reg. 20.2031·1(b) (as amended in 1965». 
126 See Treas. Reg. 20.2031·1(b). "The fair market value is the price at which the 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of 
relevant facts." [d. 
127 See Estate of Bright, 658 F. 2d at 1005. If the willing seller were assumed to be 
the actual estate it would be reasonable to assume that all of the stock would be sold 
as a block in order to reap the additional profit that a controlling interest is worth. If 
the willing buyer is assumed to be the actual legatee, who already owns a portion of 
the stock, it is reasonable to assume the buyer would be willing to pay a premium to 
obtain a controlling interest. The hypothetical seller·buyer rule, moreover, requires 
that property already in the hands or the buyer or seller must be ignored for valuation 
purposes. See id. . 
128 See id. at 1006. Here the court once again states the value is based on the in-
terest that is actually transferred, not on what was owned by the decedent before 
death or what was owned by the surviving spouse after death. See id. 
129 d L . 
130 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1006. This policy important in tax law because 
taxpayers rely on established principles to plan their affairs. See id. 
17
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when planning a taxpayer's affairS.lSl Consequently, the 
Bright court concluded that family attribution should not apply 
to stock for estate valuation purposes.182 
The IRS responded to the Bright holding by issuing Reve-
nue Ruling 81-253 in which it announced non-acquiescence. l33 
The Ruling stated that, despite the outcome in Bright, the IRS 
would not allow minority discounts with respect to transfers 
between family members unless it found evidence of family 
discord or other factors indicating that a family could not act 
't 184 as a urn. 
2. Estate of Propstra v. United States - Congressional Intent 
With Respect to Valuation Discounts and Aggregation of Hold-
ings 
In Estate of Propstra v. United States,tS5 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified the holding in 
Bright when it analyzed the language of the Treasury Regula-
tions in its attempt to determine the intent of Congress with 
respect to family aggregation rules.lss In Propstra, the hus-
band died owning an undivided one-half community property 
interest in several parcels of real estate, all of which passed to 
his surviving wife who owned the other one-half interest. ls7 On 
the husband's estate tax return, the estate claimed a fifteen 
percent discount for lack of marketability.lss The government 
disputed the discount and argued that the taxpayer must show 
181 See ill. 
182S ill ee . 
133 See Rev. RuI. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187. H tQe Internal Revenue Service dis-
agrees with a court ruling it announces "non-acquiescence." This means the IRS will 
follow the ruling only for the specific taxpayer whose case resulted in the ruling, but 
will continue to follow. what it considers to be the correct interpretation of the law 
when dealing with all other taxpayers. See Raabe, supra note 11, at 94. 
184 See Rev. RuI. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187. 
1311 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982). 
188 See ill. at1251. 
137 See id. at 1250. 
ISS See ill. 
18
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that the two interests are likely to be sold separately before 
claiming the discount. 189 In support of this argument, the IRS 
stated that, under the unity of ownership principle,14O it could 
reasonably assume that the interest held by the estate would 
eventually be sold with the other undivided interest.141 
The Ninth Circuit, as had the Fifth Circuit in Bright, looked 
to the definition of fair market value in Treasury Regulation 
20.2031-1(b) and decided that its language did not require ap-
plication of the unity of ownership rules. 142 Congress, rather 
than explicitly ordering the application of unity of ownership 
rules as it had done in other areas of tax law, simply was si-
lent. l43 The Propstra court reasoned that because the statute 
lacked specific language requiring family aggregation, it would 
not assume that Congress intended the family attribution 
rules to apply in estate tax situations.l44 Consequently, the 
Ninth Circuit in Propstra rejected the government's argument 
for using the objective standard of a hypothetical buyer and 
seller in order to avoid uncertainties involved in forcing execu-
tors to make inquiries into the feelings, attitudes and antici-
pated behavior of those holding undivided interests in prop-
146 
erty. 
In 1993, after further consideration of Ruling 81-253 and in 
light of several other cases rejecting the family aggregation 
. . I 146 th IRS k d 't . 147 In't pnnClp e, e revo e 1 non-acqwescence. 1 s 
139 . See id. at 1251. 
140 See Estate of Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1251. The court uses the term "unity of OWD-
ership principle.- This seems have the same meaning as "family attribution." See ill 
at 1251 n.4. 
141 See ill. 
142 See ill. 
143 
See Estate of Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1251. The court refers to sections 267, 318 
and 544 of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with income taxation not estate taxes. 
See id. 
144 See ill. 
146 
See id. at 1252. 
148 
See Estate of Andrews v. United States, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); and Estate of Lee v. 
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 938 (1982). 
19
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stead, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 93-12, which states that 
family relationships will not be considered when valuing gifts 
of stock in closely held corporations. 148 
3. Estate of Bonner v. United States - An Analysis of the Spe-
cial Rules for Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trusts 
In Estate of Bonner v. United States,149 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated a rule regarding 
the availability of discounts on QTIP property.l60 The Bonner 
court held that, for valuation purposes, QTIP property is not 
merged with other property oWned by the decedent. lSI Specifi-
cally, the court held that an estate could take a valuation dis-
count on a decedent's estate tax return even though a portion 
of the decedent's property was held in a trust and the remain-
der owned outright. 152 In so holding, the court focused on the 
fact that the decedent, who held only an income interest in a 
QTIP trust, lacked control over the final disposition of the 
property. 163 
Mr. Bonner died in 1989 owning a 62.5% undivided interest 
in a ranch located in Texas.lM He also owned in fee simple a 
fifty percent undivided community property interest in real 
property located in New Mexico and a fifty percent undivided 
community property interest in a pleasure boat. l66 The re-
maining 37.5% interest in the ranch and the other fifty percent 
interest in both the New Mexico property and boat was owned 
147 
See Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187. 
148 See Revenue Ruling 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202. In determining the value of a gift; of 
a minority block of stock in a closely-held corporation, the block should be valued for 
gift tax purposes without regard to the family relationship of the donee to other 
shareholders. See id. 
149 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996). 
160 See id. at 198. 
lSI See id. 
152 See id. at 197. 
163 See id. at 198. 
154 
See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 197. 
166 See id. 
20
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by a trust established by the will of his predeceased wife.l66 
The trust was a QTIP trust under I.R.C. section 2056(b)(7)157 
and thus was not subject to estate tax upon the death of the 
wife. l66 Rather, the court held that it was included in the tax-
able estate of the husband as the surviving spouse.159 Conse-
quently, Mr. Bonner's taxable estate included one hundred 
percent of the undivided interests in the three properties.l60 
In calculating the estate tax to be assessed, however, the 
estate took a forty-five percent discount based on the dece-
dent's fractional undivided interest. lSI The representative of 
the estate argued that the decedent owned only a portion of the 
property; the other portion was owned by the QTIP trust and 
was only included in the taxable estate so that it would not 
escape taxation. 162 The government, on the other hand, ar-
gued against thi~ discount, claiming that the interests held by 
the QTIP trust and the interest held by the husband merged at 
the time of death, thereby resulting in complete ownership of 
th 163 e property. 
Relying on its decision in Bright, the Fifth Circuit held that 
QTIP property is not merged with other property owned by the 
decedent. l64 Instead, QTIP property must be valued separately 
from all other property.l65 The proper value then is the value 
at which that separate property would change hands between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller .166 The court analyzed the 
hypothetical seller rule and found that family attribution, 
166 See id. Ms. Bonner died in 1986. See ill. 
157 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
158 See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 197. 
159 S id ee . 
160 
See id. 
161 S id ee . 
162S id ee . 
163 See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 198. 
164 See id. 
165 
See id. 
166 
See id. 
21
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which relies on the identity of the seller as the legatee, cannot 
control the value of the asset because the valuation is a meas-
ure of the interest that is held at the moment of death, not the 
interest held by the decedent before death or the legatee after 
d th 167 ea . 
The Bonner court also held that the estate of a decedent 
should be taxed on only those assets whose disposition the de-
cedent directs and controls.l68 In Bonner, the predeceased wife 
controlled the disposition of the property from the grave by the 
use of the trust. l69 While the husband was entitled to the in-
come for his life, the wife ultimately chose the final recipients 
of the property.l70 Neither the husband nor the estate had any 
control over the disposition even though the husband's estate 
was required to pay the tax on the property.l?1 This lack of 
control gives rise to a fractional interest discount.172 
After Bonner and Revenue Ruling 93-12, the question of 
family aggregation appears to be settled and property held in 
trust will be valued independently of other property held by 
the decedent or by the beneficiaries. 
III. FACTS OF NOWELL V. COMMISSIONER 
During their marriage, Mr. and Ms. Nowell owned and ac-
quired substantial interests in securities and real estate.173 On 
April 20, 1990, Mr. Nowell formed the A.L. Nowell Trust and 
funded it with his community property interest in one-half of 
167 See id. 
166 
See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 199. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
171 See id. at 198. Some QTIP trusts give the beneficiary a power of appointment 
over the a6sets. This was not the case in the Bonner trust. It i6 not clear whether the 
court would have allowed a discount if the husband had this control. See id. 
172 
See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 199. 
173 • See Nowell v. Commt8sioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239, 1240 (1999). 
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the securities and real estate.174 Upon his death on April 26, 
1990, the trust property was transferred into three separate 
trusts: two Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trusts 
("QTIP trusts,,)1711 and a trust entitled The Decedent's Trust. 176 
The income generated by the property in the QTIP trusts 
passed to Ms. Nowell for her life with the remainder to be dis-
tributed to the heirs selected by Mr. Nowell.177 David Prechel 
("Mr. Prechel") and Diane Prechel ("Ms. Prechel"), Ms. Now-
ell's grandchildren from a prior marriage, were these remain-
der beneficiaries.178 The trust named Ms. Nowell and Mr. Pre-
chel as cotrustees.179 
Six days before Mr. Nowell's death, Ms. Nowell formed her 
own revocable trust, the Ethel S. Nowell Trust, with her own 
community property interest. ISO Mr. Prechel and Ms. Prechel 
were the remainder beneficiaries of this trust as well.181 
In 1991, Ms. Nowell and Mr. Prechel formed two limited 
partnerships, Prechel Farms Limited Partnership (PFLP) and 
the ESN Group Limited Partnership (ESNGLP), both funded 
by the assets of Ms. Nowell's revocable trust, the QTIP trusts 
and The Decedent's Trust. 182 The partnership agreements for 
both partnerships provided that no assignee of a limited part-
174 See id. at 1240. Community property states require community property assets, 
as opposed to separate property, to be distributed equally between the parties or the 
party'8 e8tate on the death of a party or the dissolution of the marriage. All assets, 
except property acquired by gift, bequest, device or descent, generally are community 
property if the asset is acquired during marriage. See JESSE DUKEMINIER AND 
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 472 (6th ed. 2000). 
1711 One of the QTIP Trusts was an exempt trust and one was non-exempt. A dis-
cussion of the distinction is beyond the scope of this note. See supra notes 15 - 172 
and accompanying text. 176 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1240. 
177 S id 
ee . 
178 S id ee . 
179 See id. 
ISO 
See id. at 1240. 181 
See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1241. 
182 See id. 
23
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nership interest would become a limited partner unless the 
general partners consented to the assignee's admission as a 
limited partner. ISS 
The following charts indicate the pre-discounted value of 
property contributed to the partnerships and the various own-
ership interests therein. 1M 
ISS See id. at 1243. The distinction between an assignee and a partner is important 
because. in general. an assignee cannot exercise the normal rights of a partner. An 
assignee bas only the right to distribution of income from the partnership. An as-
signee cannot interfere in the management of the business or require any information 
or account of partnership transactions. 59A AM. JUR. 2d Partnerships § 506 (1987). 
1M 
See Estate of Nowell. 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1240. 
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Prechel Farms 
Limited Partnership 
Value of Interest Type of 
Contrih- in Profit Interest 
uted and 
Property Loss 
Partners 
Ethel S. Nowell Trust $1,386,500 60.41% Limited 
A L. Nowell Decedent's $300,000 13.07% Limited 
Trust 
A L. Nowell QTIP Trust - 1 $408,000 17.78% General 
A L. Nowell QTIP Trust - 2 $200,000 8.72% Limited 
David Prechel $500 0.02% General 
Total $2,295,000 100% 
ESNGroup 
Limited Partnership 
Value of Interest Type of 
Contrih- in Profit Interest 
uted and 
Property Loss 
Partners· 
Ethel S. Nowell Trust $75,000 13.04% Limited 
A L. Nowell Decedent's $300,000 52.17% General 
Trust 
A L Nowell QTIP Trust - 2 $200,000 34.79% Limited 
Total $575,000 100% 
25
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Upon Ms. Nowell's death in 1992, by the terms of the vari-
ous trusts, the 99.98% interest in PFLP not owned by Mr. Pre-
chel passed to him and all interests in the ESNGLP passed to 
Ms. Prechel. 185 The value of these transfers were discounted at 
fifty or sixty-five percent on Ms. Nowell's estate tax return to 
account for lack of control and lack of marketability. 186 
The following chart lists the values reported on the federal 
estate tax return and the discounts claimed. 187 
Type of Value of Value Dis-
Interest Property Claimed count 
Before on 
Discounts Return 
Partner 
PFLP in Ethel S. Limited $851,714 $298,100 65% 
Nowell Trust 
ESNGLP in Ethel Limited $63,800 $31,900 50% 
S. 
Nowell Trust 
PFLPinQTIP General $250,600 $125,300 50% 
Trust - 1 
PFLPin QTIP Limited $122,857 $43,000 65% 
Trust - 2 
ESNGLPin Limited $170,000 $85,000 50% 
QTIP Trust - 2 
$1,458,971 $583,300 
185 S 'd. ee, at 1241. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. The property in The Decedent's Trust was not included in the gross es-
tate of Ms. Nowell, probably because it was a credit shelter or bypass trust. Unlike 
QTIP trusts, credit protection trusts are not included in the estate of a decedent who 
holds only a life interest in the property. See Esperti, supra note 15, at 116. 
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IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The IRS challenged these discounts and determined that 
the value of the Ethel S. Nowell Trust interests should be in-
creased by $577,300 and the value of the QTIP trusts should be 
increased by $272,404.188 These adjustments, along with an 
adjustment for a small income tax refund, resulted in a defi-
ciency assessment and an additional $342,688 in estate 
taxes.189 
Mr. Prechel, as the personal representative for Ms. Nowell's 
estate, brought this action in United States Tax Court to have 
the deficiency assessment reversed. ISO Both the IRS and Mr. 
Prechel moved for partial summary judgment and both mo-
tions were granted in part and denied in part.19l The case was 
subsequently scheduled for trial regarding the amount of dis-
counts allowed, but the IRS agreed that no additional tax 
would be assessed.l92 Thus, the ruling on motions for summary 
judgment concluded the case without a determination as to the 
actual dollar amount of the discounts that were allowed.193 
V. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Nowell, the tax court analyzed and decided two separate 
issues.l94 The first issue was whether the various partnership 
interests held by the estate should be valued independently of 
188 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1241. 
189 See id. 
ISO See id at 1240. 
191 See id at 1243 - 1244. The opinion only covers the motions for summary judg-
ment. See id. 
192 See Telephone Interview with Susan Smith, of Olsen-Smith Ltd., in Phoenix, 
Ariz. (October 8, 1999). 
193 See Telephone Interview with Susan Smith, of Olsen-Smith Ltd., in Phoenix, 
Ariz. (October 8, 1999). 
194 See Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239, 1242 (1999). 
27
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each other or whether they should be merged.195 The court 
held that the interests should be valued separately.l96 The sec-
ond issue was whether the interests that passed at death were 
partnership interests or assignee interests. 197 An assignee has 
the right to distribution of income but none of the normal 
rights of a partner.19S The court examined state law and con-
cluded that they were assignee interests.l99 
A. MERGER OF INTERESTS 
The Nowell court, relying on its ruling in Estate of Mellin-
ger v. Commissioner,200 held that the interests should not be 
merged, but rather should be viewed as separate fractional 
interests held by the decedent at death.201 In Mellinger, the 
decedent died owning 2,460,580 shares of publicly traded 
stock.202 Her estate also included another 2,460,580 shares of 
the same stock held in a QTIP trust.203 Relying on the rulings 
in Bright, Propstra, and Bonner, the Mellinger court found that 
property in a QTIP trust does not actually pass to or from the 
second decedent.204 Thus, at no time does the second decedent 
195 5 id ee . 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 1242. 
198 See 59A AM. JUR. 2d Partnerships § 506 (1987). 
199 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243. 
200 112 T.C. 26 (1999). Interestingly, the same judge decided both Mellinger, and 
Nowell. Both opinions were issued on the same day. The Mellinger court relied on the 
rulings in Bright, Propstra, and Bonner to reach its conclusion. See id. 
201 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1242. This ruling allowed the estate to 
value each partnership interest as if it stood alone. Each interest was thus allowed a 
discount for lack of control and lack of marketability, despite the fact that, taken as a 
whole, the pieces represented 99.98% of the underlying property. See id. 
202 • See Estate of MellInger, 112 T.C. at 27. 
203 See id. The QTIP trust was a testamentary trust created on the death of her 
husband. The stock contributed to the QTIP trust consisted of the husband's one-half 
interest in 4,921,160 shares held as community property by the husband and wife. See 
id. 
204 See id. at 35. QTIP property actually passes on the death of the first spouse to 
the designated heirs. The surviving spouse has only a life estate in the property. A 
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control or have power of distribution over the shares held in a 
QTIP trust.206 Consequently, the Mellinger court refused to 
require the two blocks of stock aggregated for valuation pur-
poses even though the combined ownership exceeded fifty per-
cent of the corporation.206 
The Nowell court reached the same conclusion after an ad-
ditional analysis of Section 2044 of the I.R.C.207 This section 
requires only that QTIP property be included in the estate, at 
its fair market value, for purposes of determining the transfer 
tax.206 It does not require, however, that the decedent aggre-
gate QTIP assets with other assets owned at death.209 The 
court contrasted this with sections 267, 318, and 544, which 
specifically require aggregation of ownership for various in-
come tax purposes.210 The explicit nature of these sections il-
lustrate that Congress could have provided for family aggrega-
tion, but did noe11 By reverse implication then, because Con-
gress was silent on the issue of family aggregation for QTIP 
property, Congress did not intend for QTIP property to be ag-
gregated with other interests held by the decedent.212 
To rebut this theory, the IRS urged that it is precisely be-
cause QTIP trust property is included in the taxable estate 
life estate is extinguished on the death of the holder and normally is not included in 
the estate of the second decedent. QTIP property is an exception to this rule and is 
simply an election by the taxpayers to include the value of the property only in the 
estate of the second spouse to die. See supra notes 15 - 172 and accompanying text. 
205 See Estate of Mellinger, 112 T.C. at 36. 
206 • See ill at 33 - 35. 
207 See I.R.C. § 2044(a). "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of 
any property to which this section applies in which the decedent had a qualifying 
interest for life." ld. The code then goes on to say that this section applies to any 
property for which a QTIP election was made. See ill. 
20B See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1242. 
209 • See ill. 
210 See ill. Sections 267, 318, and 544 generally require related parties to treat 
their separate holdings 88 a single block and restrict the ability to deduct losses re-
sulting from transfers between related parties. I.R.C. §§ 267, 318, and 544 (1999). 
211 
See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1242. 
212 See ill. 
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that Ms. Nowell should be treated as the owner of the property 
at her death for purposes of valuation.218 The court found not 
only that the IRS had used the same line of reasoning in Mel-
linger but that the facts in Nowell bore enough similarity to 
warrant another rejection of the IRS's argument. 214 
B. AsSIGNEE OR PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS 
In addressing the second issue, the court looked at the 
transfer of both general and limited partnership interests and 
afforded each a different treatment based on specific language 
in the partnership agreements.2111 The partnership agree-
ments, executed by Ms. Nowell and Mr. Prechel for both Pre-
chel Farms Limited Partnership and the ESN Group Limited 
Partnership, provided that an assignee of a limited partner-
ship interest could not become a limited partner unless all 
general partners consented to the assignee's admission as a 
limited partner.218 The IRS argued that this limitation should 
be disregarded because Mr. and Ms. Prechel, as assignees, held 
one hundred percent of the general partnership interests and, 
therefore, could admit themselves as partners.217 The court 
relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Propstra, which hold-
ing that, "[t]he property to be valued for estate tax purposes is 
that which the decedent actually transfers at death rather 
than the interest held by the decedent before death, or that 
held by the legatee after death. ,,21S The court thus refused to 
consider the interests held by Mr. and Ms. Prechel after Ms. 
218 See id. 
214 See id. 
216 S id. ee at 1243. 
218 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1241. The distinction between an as-
signee and a partner is important because, in general, an assignee cannot exercise the 
normal rights of a partner. An assignee has only the right to distribution of income 
from the partnership. An 88signee cannot interfere in the management of the busi-
ness or require any information or account of partnership transactions. 59A AM. JUR. 
2d Partnerships § 506 (1987). 
217 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243. 
21S See id. {citing Estate of Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248,1251 (9th Cir. 
1982». 
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Nowell's death and stated that it must use the objective stan-
dard of a hypothetical buyer and seller to determine if the gen-
eral partners would elect to admit the heirs as new partners, 
rather than the actual facts.219 Under this objective standard 
the identity of the general partners cannot be assumed to be 
that of the assignees.22O 
The Nowell court next addressed the effect of state law on 
valuation of the limited partnership interests.221 In determin-
ing the proper valuation, a court must first apply state law to 
determine the nature of the property and then apply federal 
law to determine the proper taxation of that property.222 Under 
Arizona law,223 a partner in a limited partnership may transfer 
to an assignee only the right to receive distributions of cash or 
other property.224 He or she may not transfer the rights and 
powers of a partner, unless the partnership agreement allows 
for such a transfer.225 The agreements for both the Prechel 
Farms Limited Partnership and the ESN Group Limited Part-
nership did not allow such a transfer. Rather, the agreements 
stated: 
A person who acquires one or more units but who is not 
admitted as a substituted limited partner . . . (1) shall 
be entitled only to allocations and disbursements with 
respect to such units in accordance with these articles, 
(2) shall have no right to any information or accounting 
of the affairs of the partnership, (3) shall not be entitled 
to inspect the books and records of the partnership, (4) 
shall not have any of the rights of a general partner or a 
219 See id. 
220 • See id. This ruling allowed the estate to take further discounts on top of the 
discounts already allowed for lack of control and marketability. See icl. 
221 
See Estate of NoweU, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243. 
222 See id. 
22S Ms. Nowell died as a resident of Arizona. See id at 1240. 
224 See id at 1243. 
225 
See id. Arizona law provides, "An assignment entitles the assignee to receive, to 
the extent assigned, only the distribution to which the assignor would be entitled.· 
ARIz. REv. STAT. § 29-340 (1999). 
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limited partner under the act or these articles, but (5) 
shall be subject to the obligations of a unit holder under 
these articles ... 226 
From this language the court concluded that the rights and 
powers of the limited partnership interests passed to Mr. and 
Ms. Prechel as assignee interests, and should be valued as 
such, rather than as full partnership interests.227 
The court, however, refused to allow the same treatment for 
the assignment of the general partnership interest.22B Origi-
nally, Mr. Prechel held a 0.02% general partnership interest in 
the Prechel Farms Limited Partnership.229 At Ms. Nowell's 
death, Mr. Prechel inherited another 17.78 % of this general 
partnership interest, the rights of which were unrestricted un-
der the partnership agreement.2S0 Consequently, the court held 
that without the approval requirements associated with the 
limited partnership interests the general partnership interest 
automatically treated the beneficiary as a partner.281 For this 
reason, the court held that the partnership interest should be 
valued as a general partnership interest.282 Accordingly, the 
discount available on the interest should be reduced because 
226 
Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) atl241. 
227 See ill. at 1243. The opinion, however, offered no guidance on how the value 
&bould be determined. 
226 See ill. 
229 See id. at124O. 
230 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1240. The agreement stated, '"[a] trans-
feree of units from a general panner hereunder shall be admitted as a general partner 
with respect to such units if (a) at the time of such transfer, such transferee is other-
wise a general partner ...... See id. at 1241. 
281 See id. at 1243. This was an unfortunate decision for the beneficiary because he 
contributed only $500 for his less than one-percent general partnership interest. This 
small amount resulted in the loss of a significant discount on an interest with an 
original contribution value of $408,000. See id. 282 
See ill. Unfortunately the published opinion again offers no guidance on the 
proper valuation of this interest. 
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general partners have management and control rights in the 
partnership.2S3 
The court granted partial summary judgment to the estate 
of Ms. Nowell by finding the limited partnership interests 
passed to Mr. and Ms. Prechel as assignee interests.2M How-
ever, the court also granted partial summary judgment to the 
IRS by finding the general partnership interests passed as full 
partnership interests.235 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The analysis in Nowell was correct, based on the Internal 
Revenue Code and case law. On the issue of family aggrega-
tion, courts have consistently held that, for valuation purposes, 
neither what the transferor held before the transfer nor what 
the recipient held after the transfer should be the basis for the 
valuation.236 Rather, the calculation must only consider the 
interest that was actually transferred. This applies equally to 
the question of assignee interests versus partnership interests. 
Even though an assignee owns all of the outstanding partner-
ship interests and can easily vote to convert his or her assignee 
interests to partnership interests, the IRS cannot be assumed 
he or she will do so. The court was correct in holding that 
when an interest in a limited partnership is transferred and 
the partnership agreement limits a transferee to an assignee 
interest, the other holdings of that transferee are not consid-
ered for valuing the interest transferred. 
This result is a windfall for estate planners because it es-
tablishes a bright-line formula by which very large valuation 
discounts can be obtained using relatively simple estate plan-
ning techniques. These techniques allowed a husband and 
233 See supra notes 42 - 83 and accompanying text. 
2M See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243. 
235 • See id. at 1240 - 1241. 
236 See Estate of Bonner v. Commissioner, 84 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1996); Estate 
of Propstra v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir.1982); Estate of Bright v. 
Commissioner, 658 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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wife, with an estate worth over two million dollars, to effec-
tively hold property for their entire lives and pass the entire 
estate on to their intended heirs with reduced tax liability. 
Although the court is silent on the actual value of the taxable 
estate, the only property on which it reduced the valuation dis-
count was the general partnership interest in PFLP held by 
the A. L. Nowell QTIP Trust_1.237 Had the partners named the 
A. L. Nowell Decedent's trust as the only general partner in 
PFLP, the estate would have completely escaped estate tax 
liability because this trust was not included in the taxable es-
tate of Ms. Nowell and the remaining assets were valued at 
less than the unified credit amount. 
The key to using Nowell to develop a workable estate plan 
is the proper application of the state law under which the 
partnership is formed. Although only briefly mentioned in 
Nowell, section 2704(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides 
that restrictions on transfers of an interest in partnerships 
between family members will be disregarded for valuation 
purposes unless the restriction is less than or equal to that 
imposed by state law.238 In Nowell, the Arizona limited part-
nership law limited assignee rights to distribution of income 
only.239 The partnership agreements in Nowell contained a 
237 . . See Estate of Nowell v. COIllDllssloner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239, 1243 (1999). The 
court did not allow the general partnership interest held by the QTIP trust to be val-
ued as an assignee interest. The discount claimed on the tax return was fifty percent 
or $125,300. Although the opinion does not state the discount that was allowed it can 
be presumed that some discount was allowed to account for the fractional interest 
(17.78 %) that this partner held. Using the full fifty percent discount claimed the total 
value of the estate was $583,300. The unified credit exempts the first $600,000 of 
assets from estate tax so even a significant reduction in the discount would result in a 
relatively small amount of asset value being subjected to tax. See id. 
23B See I.R.C. § 2704(b) 
(1) For purposes of this subtitle if - there is a transfer of an interest in a 
corporation or partnership to (or for the benefit ot) a member of the trans-
feror's family, and the transferor and members of the transferor's family 
hold, immediately before the transfer, control of the entity, any applicable 
restriction shall be disregarded in determining the value of the transferred 
interest. (2) ... The term restriction shall not include - any restriction im-
posed, or required to be imposed, by any federal or state law. Id. 239 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 29-340 (West 1999). "An assignment entitles the assignee to 
receive, to the extent assigned, only the distribution to which the assignor would be 
entitled." Id. 
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similar restriction on assignee interests that was no greater 
than the state law.240 This was critical in obtaining the maxi-
mum discount available. If the partnership agreement had 
contained a restriction on the rights of a holder of an interest 
greater than the controlling state law, the restriction would 
have been disregarded for valuation purposes and the discount 
would have been lost. 
Given this ability to significantly reduce estate taxes, Con-
gress may attempt to enact a prohibition on the use of valua-
tion discounts. President Clinton's recent budget proposal con-
tained such a restriction on the use of discounts on most family 
limited partnerships. The bill, however, would still have al-
lowed their use in active trades or businesses.241 The Republi-
can-dominated House and Senate went to the opposite extreme 
when it sent to the President a bill that would have eliminated 
the estate tax entirely. President Clinton, as expected, vetoed 
the bill. Nevertheless, with the present tax reduction goals of 
the lawmakers, Congress probably will not place obstacles in 
the path of those who seek to reduce taxes by judicially-
approved means. Thus, Nowell's use of valuation discounts 
appears to be a valid estate planning tool. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The magnitude of the discounts allowed in Nowell and the 
clear formula for obtaining those discounts provides estate 
planners with a method to significantly reduce the estate tax 
burden on families. A family limited partnership and a series 
of QTIP trusts may be used to split up a family's assets so that 
the sum of the parts are valued at far less than the whole. 
Under the ruling in Bonner, and affirmed in Nowell, QTIP 
trusts effectively divide the assets into fractional interests that 
are not aggregated for valuation purposes, thus permitting the 
use of the fractional interest discounts to reduce their value for 
tax liabilities. The QTIP trusts can then be made limited 
240 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1241. 
241 See Lee A. Sheppard, The Need for Family Limited Partnership Legislation, 82 
TAX NOTES TODAY 1095, 1095 (1999). 
35
Stanaland: Estate Tax
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000
714 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
partners in a limited partnership to which they contribute 
their assets. In this partnership, the one general partner has 
contributed very little and thus has a minimal interest. The 
bulk of the remaining assets are acquired from limited part-
ners who, although they have contributed much, hold only 
limited partnership interests with no control over the business. 
This lack of control allows for the discount. Consequently, 
practitioners should draft partnership agreements so that any 
assignees acquire full limited partnership interests only on 
approval of the other partners. Thus, when transferees inherit 
an interest, that interest will be only an assignee interest for 
valuation purposes and the estate can obtain yet another dis-
count. Under Nowell, this is permissible even if the transfer-
ees already own all the other outstanding interests in the 
partnership and can easily convert the assignee interest to a 
full partnership interest. 
Russell Stanaland-
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